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DOES ATKINS MAKE A DIFFERENCE IN NON-CAPITAL
CASES? SHOULD IT?
Paul Marcus*
I. AN OVERVIEW
The holding in Atkins v. Virginia1 is clear. The execution of mentally retarded
defendants, those people with intellectual disabilities, is unconstitutional. One other
feature of the Atkins decision is also certain, the reason the Eighth Amendment is
violated with the use of the death penalty with such convicted defendants. That is
because defendants with intellectual disabilities are to be viewed as less culpable than
other defendants.
Mentally retarded persons frequently know the difference
between right and wrong and are competent to stand trial. Because
of their impairments, however, by definition they have diminished
capacities to understand and process information, to communi-
cate, to abstract from mistakes and learn from experience, to
engage in logical reasoning, to control impulses, and to under-
stand the reactions of others. There is no evidence that they are
more likely to engage in criminal conduct than others, but there
is abundant evidence that they often act on impulse rather than
pursuant to a premeditated plan, and that in group settings they
are followers rather than leaders. Their deficiencies do not war-
rant an exemption from criminal sanctions, but they do diminish
their personal culpability.2
In this Article, I take a look at what—if any—impact the Atkins rationale and
its holding have had in non-capital cases. I examine three areas: confessions (both
voluntariness determinations and understanding of Miranda warnings), the ability
of those with intellectual disabilities to assist their lawyers in making plea decisions
or in creating a defense to criminal prosecutions, and sentencing. These three areas
are of genuine significance because they focus on an accused’s understanding of the
process and also the degree of culpability for the offense.
Let us begin with some thoughts regarding a few of the key underlying matters
here. While the Atkins majority opinion does not waver on its basic holding and
* Haynes Professor of Law, William & Mary Law School. With many thanks to Mary
Sue Backus, Jeff Bellin, John Blume, and Adam Gershowitz for their thoughtful comments.
1 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
2 Id. at 318 (footnote omitted). The terminology has now been changed, so that “intellectual
disability” is used in place of “mentally retarded.” Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1990 (2014).
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rationale, more than a dozen years later the answers to a number of important questions
coming from the decision remain in doubt. As several articles in this symposium
issue show, we really do not know which capital defendants are to be seen as suffi-
ciently intellectually deficient to be covered by the Atkins ruling, what procedures
are to be used in making that determination, and which standards must be applied.
More to the point for my purpose here, there is an awful lot of basic information out
there that is, at best, uncertain.
As two contributors to our symposium have laid out, the Atkins Court used a
three-prong clinical definition of mental retardation:
The first prong of the definition is that an individual must
exhibit significantly subaverage intellectual functioning. The
second prong requires that the individual experience significant
limitations in adaptive functioning, which is measured by cate-
gories that relate to everyday living experiences in a typical (i.e.,
non-institutional) community environment. The third prong
requires that these limitations must have manifested before the
person reached the age of eighteen.3
This definition is based on those given by the American Association on Intellectual and
Developmental Disabilities—formerly the American Association on Mental Retar-
dation—and by the American Psychiatric Association in its Diagnostic and Statisti-
cal Manual of Mental Disorders.4 Numerous other formal or “working” definitions,
however, surfaced.5 Moreover, the procedures used to apply the definitions varied
3 John H. Blume, Sheri Lynn Johnson & Christopher Seeds, An Empirical Look at
Atkins v. Virginia and Its Application in Capital Cases, 76 TENN. L. REV. 625, 629 (2009)
(footnote omitted).
4 See John H. Blume, Sheri Lynn Johnson & Christopher Seeds, Of Atkins and Men:
Deviations from Clinical Definitions of Mental Retardation in Death Penalty Cases, 18
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 689, 690–91 (2009) (explaining that the Supreme Court has
embraced clinical definitions of “mentally retarded” from these sources).
5 See, for instance, these statements:
• “An offender with very significant subaverage general intellectual functioning
existing concurrently with the substantial deficits in adaptive behavior is
referred to within this part as a seriously mentally retarded offender.” ABA
CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS § 7-9.1(c) (1986).
• “‘Mentally retarded’ means having significantly subaverage general intel-
lectual functioning resulting in or associated with impairments in adaptive
behavior which manifested during the developmental period.” GA. CODE ANN.
§ 17-7-131(a)(3) (2014).
• “Persons with mental retardation are usually defined as those with an IQ below
70, but practically speaking, such persons can be described with fair accuracy
as having a childlike quality of thinking, coupled with slowness in learning new
material. Mentally retarded persons have little long-term perspective and little
ability to understand the consequence of their actions. They are usually fol-
lowers and are easily manipulated.” Joan R. Petersilia, Criminal Justice Policies
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greatly, leaving the Supreme Court to finally step in this past year to attempt to sort
through at least the process to be used to identify those who are intellectually disabled.
The defendant in Hall v. Florida6 was convicted in 1981 of a 1978 murder and
sentenced to death.7 On a later appeal in 1999, the Florida Supreme Court wrote that
“there is no doubt that the Defendant has serious mental difficulties, is probably some-
what retarded, and certainly has learning difficulties and a speech impediment . . . .”8
Relying on language in Atkins that indicated IQ scores under “approximately 70”
usually indicate retardation,9 the Florida legislature passed a law establishing a firm
rule that lawyers for defendants claiming to be mentally retarded had to show an IQ
of 70 or below for their clients.10 In a 2012 opinion, the state high court ruled that Hall
Toward the Mentally Retarded Are Unjust and Waste Money, RAND CORP.
(1997), http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB4011/index1.html.
Even some judges tried their hand at crafting workable definitions. Here is one, from the
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, with seven evidentiary factors which fact finders in the
criminal trial context might also focus upon in weighing evidence as indicative of mental
retardation or of a personality disorder:
• Did those who knew the person best during the developmental
stage—his family, friends, teachers, employers, authorities—think
he was mentally retarded at that time, and, if so, act in accordance
with that determination?
• Has the person formulated plans and carried them through or is his
conduct impulsive?
• Does his conduct show leadership or does it show that he is led
around by others?
• Is his conduct in response to external stimuli rational and
appropriate, regardless of whether it is socially acceptable?
• Does he respond coherently, rationally, and on point to oral or written
questions or do his responses wander from subject to subject?
• Can the person hide facts or lie effectively in his own or others’
interests?
• Putting aside any heinousness or gruesomeness surrounding the
capital offense, did the commission of that offense require
forethought, planning, and complex execution of purpose?
Ex parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d 1, 8–9 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). For good overviews of the various
definitions, see Jeffrey Usman, Capital Punishment, Cultural Competency, and Litigating
Intellectual Disability, 42 U. MEM. L. REV. 855 (2012), and Jacqueline Gonzales, Comment,
Improving the Handling of Mentally Retarded Defendants in the Criminal Justice System,
17 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 143 (2011).
6 134 S. Ct. 1986 (2014).
7 Id. at 1990.
8 Hall v. State, 742 So. 2d 225, 229 (Fla. 1999).
9 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 308 n.3 (2002) (citing THE DIAGNOSTIC AND STATIS-
TICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 42–43 (4th ed. text rev. 2000)).
10 FLA. STAT. § 921.137(1) (2012):
Imposition of the death sentence upon a defendant with mental retar-
dation prohibited.—
434 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 23:431
could be executed because his IQ had been measured at various times as 71, 73, and
80,11 and that “Florida, while not unique in its use of a bright-line cutoff score of 70,
is not in the majority, although there is no clear national consensus.”12
The United States Supreme Court rejected the bright-line cutoff.13 While the Court
split 5–4 on the ultimate holding in Hall,14 all nine Justices emphasized the contin-
ued viability of the Atkins ruling. To be sure, the only question before the Court was
(1) As used in this section, the term “mental retardation” means
significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning existing con-
currently with deficits in adaptive behavior and manifested during the
period from conception to age 18. The term “significantly subaverage
general intellectual functioning,” for the purpose of this section, means
performance that is two or more standard deviations from the mean
score on a standardized intelligence test specified in the rules of the
Agency for Persons with Disabilities.
This phrase “‘performance that is two or more standard deviations from the mean score on
a standardized intelligence test’” was held by the Florida Supreme Court to be an IQ cutoff
of 70. Cherry v. State, 959 So. 2d 702, 712–13 (Fla. 2007) (A “strict cutoff of an IQ score
of 70 [is needed] in order to establish significantly subaverage intellectual functioning.”).
11 Hall v. State, 109 So. 3d 704, 707 (Fla. 2012).
12 Id. at 714 (Pariente, J., concurring).
13 A decision handed down just months before the Supreme Court ruling demonstrates just
how difficult the application of a bright-line Atkins standard had become. In O’Neal v.
Bagley, 728 F.3d 552 (6th Cir. 2013), amended by 743 F.3d 1010 (6th Cir. 2013), the
defendant was sentenced to death. He claimed, on a habeas corpus review, that he was
“mentally retarded and therefore ineligible for execution under Atkins.” Id. at 562. He relied
heavily on the fact that he had scored below 70 on three different IQ tests. Id. The majority of
the court, giving considerable deference to the state judges with a habeas review, rejected the
claim noting that IQ scores are just “‘one of the many factors that need to be considered’ in
‘mak[ing] a final determination of this issue.’” Id. at 563 (alteration in original) (quoting
State v. Lott, 779 N.E.2d 1011, 1014 (Ohio 2002)). O’Neal, the majority decided, could not carry
the burden of rebutting the presumed correctness of the state court’s decision. Id. at 558–59.
The dissenter sharply disagreed:
Implicit in the opinion of my colleagues in the majority is the sugges-
tion that they would reach a different conclusion if they did not have to
“defer” to the state court’s “findings.” My view is that the state court’s
opinion, based mainly on its reliance on its presumption, is a finding so
far out of the mainstream of scientific opinion—indeed, directly contrary
to scientific opinion—as to deserve no deference. Moreover, the Supreme
Court opinion in Atkins, as quoted above, appears to say that presuming
normality from one IQ test of 71 is improper when the “cut off” of
mental retardation is considered to be 75. A state court opinion that
defies both modern scientific opinion and applicable language in Atkins
deserves no deference.
Id. at 566–67 (Merritt, J., dissenting); see also In re Campbell, 750 F.3d 523 (5th Cir. 2014)
(habeas petition finding defendant ineligible for execution under Atkins).
14 Justice Kennedy wrote the majority opinion. Justice Alito, joined by the Chief Justice
and Justices Scalia and Thomas, dissented.
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“how intellectual disability must be defined in order to implement these [constitu-
tional] principles and the holding of Atkins.”15
The majority found that Florida’s sharp cutoff point violated the constitution and
was contrary to Atkins.
Intellectual disability is a condition, not a number . . . . Courts must
recognize, as does the medical community, that the IQ test is
imprecise . . . . [I]n using these scores to assess a defendant’s
eligibility for the death penalty, a State must afford these test
scores that same studied skepticism that those who design and use
the tests do, and understand that an IQ test score represents a range
rather than a fixed number.16
Even in light of Hall, knowledgeable people may not be able to reach a consen-
sus on the precise definition or standard to be used. Still, one would think that there
ought to be some agreement as to the number of individuals in the U.S. criminal
justice system who are covered by whatever definition is used. That turns out not to
be the case.
Extensive research has shown that there are no reliable numbers out there; at
best we have some educated guesses. Many experienced professionals write that in
terms of all crimes committed in our nation, less than one percent—probably well
less than one percent—are acts that are suitable to be viewed as capital crimes, an
area where some numbers are available.17 If the question is how many individuals
with intellectual disabilities commit non-capital crimes, or are incarcerated, the most
15 Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1988 (2014) (citation omitted).
16 Id. at 1993. The majority explained further:
Florida seeks to execute a man because he scored a 71 instead of 70 on
an IQ test. Florida is one of just a few States to have this rigid rule.
Florida’s rule misconstrues the Court’s statements in Atkins that intel-
lectually [sic] disability is characterized by an IQ of “approximately
70.” Florida’s rule is in direct opposition to the views of those who de-
sign, administer, and interpret the IQ test. By failing to take into account
the standard error of measurement, Florida’s law not only contradicts the
test’s own design but also bars an essential part of a sentencing court’s
inquiry into adaptive functioning. Freddie Lee Hall may or may not be
intellectually disabled, but the law requires that he have the opportunity
to present evidence of his intellectual disability, including deficits in
adaptive functioning over his lifetime.
Id. at 2001 (citation omitted).
17 As of January 1, 2014, there are 3,070 people on death row in the U.S. See Death Row
Inmates by State, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER (Jan. 1, 2014), http://www.deathpenaltyinfo
.org/death-row-inmates-state-and-size-death-row-year. “[M]ore than 99 percent of criminal
defendants . . . do not face a death sentence . . . .” Rachel E. Barkow, The Court of Life and
Death: The Two Tracks of Constitutional Sentencing Law and the Case for Uniformity, 107
MICH. L. REV. 1145, 1189 (2009).
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educated guesses look something like these: “[T]he best available data suggest that
at least forty-five thousand, and perhaps more than two hundred thousand, mentally
retarded people currently are imprisoned in the United States.”18 Or, it could be that,
the range is something like “4% to 10%” of the prison population.19 Or, by region,
there are a bit less than 3% of the incarcerated population in one area of the nation
versus more than 24% in another.20 Or, the best that could be said is that there are
more than 14% of those incarcerated in the U.S. who are intellectually disabled;21
but those figures are likely low because they may count only those in prison, and not
those in jail or out on probation.22 In short, as one observer noted with exasperation
more than fifteen years ago:
No one knows the exact number of MR housed in jail or
prison, or on probation or parole. Such statistics are not main-
tained for any of these populations, and only for the prison popu-
lation have national estimates been attempted. In fact, all available
data on the prevalence rates or characteristics of persons with MR
or DD within the criminal justice system must be viewed with ex-
treme caution. Despite universal agreement that individuals with
MR are not handled appropriately in the justice system, little
18 Morgan Cloud, George B. Shepherd, Alison Nodvin Barkoff & Justin V. Shur, Words
Without Meaning: The Constitution, Confessions, and Mentally Retarded Suspects, 69 U.
CHI. L. REV. 495, 504 (2002).
19 Joan Petersilia, Unequal Justice? Offenders with Mental Retardation in Prison, 1
CORRECTIONS MGMT. Q. 33, 37 (1997). The writer notes that, in 1997, there were an
“estimated [50,000] U.S. inmates with mental retardation.” Id. at 36. In 1997, about 1.7 mil-
lion Americans were incarcerated in state and federal prisons and jails. BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 177613, CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE
UNITED STATES, 1997 at 2 (2000), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpus97.pdf. The popu-
lation of the U.S. that year was approximately 266 million people. U.S. BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, PUB. NO. P23-194, 1997 POPULATION PROFILE OF THE
UNITED STATES 2 (1998), http://www.census.gov/prod/3/98pubs/p23-194.pdf. In 2012 about
1.6 million Americans were incarcerated in state and federal prisons and jails. E. ANN CARSON
& DANIELA GOLINELLI, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 242467, PRISONERS IN 2012—ADVANCE
COUNTS 1 (2013), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p12ac.pdf. The population of the U.S.
that year was approximately 314 million people. U.S. and World Population Clock, U. S.
CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/popclock/ (click “Select a Date”; then select a month
and the year 2012).
20 Jeanice Dagher-Margosian, Representing the Cognitively Disabled Client in a Criminal
Case, DISABILITIES PROJECT NEWS (State Bar of Mich.) Mar. 2006, at 1, 3, http://www.mich
bar.org/programs/EAI/pdfs/disabledclient0905.pdf (“Research shows that between 24.3%
(in the southeastern United States) and 2.6% (in the northwestern United States) of the U.S.
prison population are mentally retarded.”).
21 Elizabeth Nevins-Saunders, Incomprehensible Crimes: Defendants with Mental Retar-
dation Charged with Statutory Rape, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1067, 1072 n.22 (2010).
22 Dagher-Margosian, supra note 20, at 3.
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official attention has been paid to the problem, and basic statis-
tics in every aspect of the problem are lacking.23
To be sure, there is not even agreement as to the types of crimes such disabled sus-
pects are charged with, or convicted of. Because of the skewed reporting system in
this context, one may hear that these defendants commit more serious crimes than
the general population.24 This view has been strongly challenged. Indeed, as noted in
the 1991 Report of the President’s Commission on Mental Retardation, that conclusion
is misleading because it is based on data from prisons, “which are likely to receive
inmates who commit serious crimes. Less serious crimes frequently do not lead to
incarceration,”25 or, if they do, it is in jails and not prisons.26
23 Joan Petersilia, Justice for All? Offenders with Mental Retardation and the California
Corrections System, 77 PRISON J. 358, 365 (1997). Though Dr. Petersilia—the Co-Director
of the Stanford Criminal Justice Center—lamented this evidentiary state of affairs almost two
decades ago, that statement rings just as true today. Some more recent works guess at the
numbers—not differing much from those guesses found in the 1990s—but none actually
relies on empirical research that has been conducted in the new millennium. See, e.g., Fred
Cohen, The Limits of the Judicial Reform of Prisons: What Works; What Does Not, 40 CRIM.
L. BULL. 421, 459 n.184 (2004). See generally JOHN W. PARRY, CRIMINAL MENTAL HEALTH
AND DISABILITY LAW, EVIDENCE AND TESTIMONY: A COMPREHENSIVE REFERENCE MANUAL
FOR LAWYERS, JUDGES, AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROFESSIONALS (2009) (examining the legal
relationships that link criminal justice and mental health).
24 The confusion here may go to the categories of defendants and particular crimes. To
be sure, there is evidence that defendants who are mentally ill are more likely than others to
commit violent offenses. “Thirty-three percent of federal inmates identified as mentally ill had
been convicted of a violent offense, compared to 13 percent of other inmates. In state facilities,
53 percent of mentally ill inmates had been convicted of a violent offense[], compared to 46
percent of other inmates.” The Jailed and Imprisoned Mentally Ill, FRONTLINE, http://www
.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/crime/jailed/ (last visited Dec. 1, 2014) (relying on
PAULA M. DITTON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 174463, MENTAL HEALTH AND TREATMENT
OF INMATES AND PROBATIONERS (1999), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/mhtip.pdf).
However, those who are intellectually disabled are not necessarily mentally ill, though lawyers
and judges sometimes inartfully conclude that they are.
25 PRESIDENT'S COMM. ON MENTAL RETARDATION, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., DHHS PUB. NO. (ACF) 93-21046, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT: CITIZENS WITH
MENTAL RETARDATION AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 5 (1991) [hereinafter REPORT
TO THE PRESIDENT].
26 See the comments of Professors Noble and Conley in THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM AND
MENTAL RETARDATION: DEFENDANTS AND VICTIMS 40 (Ronald W. Conley et al. eds., 1992):
Although frequently cited, these data on the frequency of serious
crimes committed by persons with mental retardation are misleading.
To begin with, as noted by Brown and Courtless (1971), the prisons
from which these data are derived house individuals who commit the
more serious types of crimes. Offenders with mental retardation who
are in local jails or are placed into community diversion programs would
generally be expected to have committed much less serious crimes. In
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One very real problem here is that many individuals with these intellectual dis-
bilities are not identified as such early in the criminal justice process, or they are never
identified. We lawyers and judges are not especially skilled observers in this area,
while many of the disabled persons are very adept in “trying to prevent any discovery
of their handicap.”27 As former North Carolina Chief Justice James Exum put it: “I
suppose I am a pretty good representative of the judiciary because the truth is that
judges, by and large, don’t know much about mental retardation.”28 Indeed, even when
lawyers and judges do identify the disability, their reaction may not be especially
sensitive and thoughtful. Numerous examples abound, but Hart v. State29 is a strik-
ing recent illustration of a lawyer who seemingly did not raise the disability at trial.
The defendant was a nineteen-year-old with a “full scale intelligence quotient of
between forty-seven and fifty-two and the mental age of approximately an average
six year old.”30 On the advice of counsel, he pleaded guilty to three counts of sexual
assault of a child, and two counts of indecency with a child.31 Texas involves its juries
in the sentencing process.32 The jury sentenced the defendant to thirty years impris-
onment on each of the first three counts, and five years on each of the second two.
The trial judge ordered the penalties to be served consecutively—a total of 100 years
addition, one would expect the percentage of severe crimes reported
among all prison inmates to be greater than among new admissions,
since inmates who commit the more severe crimes will usually receive
longer prison sentences and over time will represent an increasing pro-
portion of inmates who remain in prison. Consistent with this obser-
vation is a report by the Illinois Mentally Retarded and Mentally Ill
Offender Task Force (1988), which concluded: “Despite common mis-
conceptions that this population commits the majority of violent felony
crimes, in reality the overwhelming majority of offenses committed by
persons who are mentally retarded and/or mentally ill are misdemeanors,
less serious felonies, and public disturbances.” Similarly, White and
Wood (1985, 1986), reporting on a special community program for
offenders with mental retardation, noted that over half of the program
participants had committed only misdemeanors.
Whatever the actual numbers for adults, the numbers for intellectually challenged juveniles
are thought to be considerably higher. See Kathleen A. Murphy, Lost in Translation: The Right
to Competency and the Right to Counsel for Mentally Retarded Children in the Juvenile
Justice System, 51 HOW. L.J. 367, 368 (2008) (“[U]p to 12% of incarcerated children are
mentally retarded.”).
27 Richard J. Bonnie, The Competence of Criminal Defendants with Mental Retardation
to Participate in Their Own Defense, 81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 419, 420–21 (1990).
28 Conley et al., supra note 26, at 1.
29 314 S.W.3d 37 (Tex. App. 2010).
30 Id. at 39.
31 Id.
32 See Robert A. Weninger, Jury Sentencing in Noncapital Cases: A Case Study of El
Paso County, Texas, 45 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 3, 4 (“Texas defendants . . . may
elect to have their sentence assessed by either a judge or jury . . . .”).
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imprisonment—though the prosecution had not made such a request.33 There the
entire claim was for leniency for sentencing by the jury; the actions of the defense
lawyer, as explained by the court on appeal, were baffling:
Even though Hart’s defense was relying on the hope of
leniency based on his mental retardation, no evidence was sub-
mitted to the jury that used the term “mentally retarded” or any
variation of that phrase. Given the speech impediment with which
Hart is afflicted, it is impossible to determine how much the fact
that Hart’s testimony was disjointed was attributed by the jury
to his retarded condition and how much of it the jurors might
have determined was due to the speech impediment. Despite this,
without any further evidence or testimony introduced to the jury,
Hart’s counsel argued during closing argument that Hart was
“obviously mentally retarded” and asked the jury to award him
community supervision.34
II. THE IMPACT OF ATKINS
The difficulties with the application of Atkins are readily apparent. What is sur-
prising, however, is that review of reported non-capital cases shows an almost total
avoidance of Atkins. In three key areas, this result is especially problematic.
A. Confessions
In reading reported decisions involving intellectually disabled criminal defen-
dants, there is little doubt that such defendants confess quite often. That state of af-
fairs might be obvious to the savvy observer, as such suspects can “be overwhelmed
by police presence . . . [they] say what they think officers want to hear.”35 They are
“significantly more suggestible . . . [there is] a greater eagerness to please the
33 Hart, 314 S.W.3d at 39.
34 Id. at 43. One must wonder to what degree this might be related to a lack of resources for
indigent defense. The lawyer may seem unsophisticated and inept as to mental disabilities; but
she also could have been an overworked court appointed counsel with very little client contact,
or no resources for evaluation or expert testimony. Many have made this point effectively.
For my take on the matter, with my very able co-author, see Mary Sue Backus & Paul
Marcus, The Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases, a National Crisis, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 1031
(2006). The argument to apply Atkins to non-capital cases will simply not be made in many
public defender or court appointed cases because the lawyers may not have the training, the time,
or the experts to present this view to the court.
35 See generally Leigh Ann Davis, People with Intellectual Disabilities in the Criminal
Justice Systems: Victims & Suspects, THE ARC (2009), http://www.thearc.org/document.doc
?id=3664.
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interviewer.”36 This may be true even if the suspects did not actually commit the
crime for which they have been arrested. Justice Stevens in Atkins referred to a case
involving “one mentally retarded person who unwittingly confessed to a crime that he
did not commit.”37 I will turn below to the application of the legal standards of Due
Process and Miranda; still, it is important to bear in mind here that there are many
cases in which the broad matter of intellectually disabled defendants confessing openly
without undue persuasion is raised. In such cases the defendant may be “crying and
wringing his hands, but stating without prompting what he claims he was earlier told
to say.”38 Or the suspect may be “incapable of understanding Miranda warnings . . .
frequently answer[ing] questions in a completely irrelevant manner . . . only [able
to] express herself at a ‘very simple childish level’ and [unable to] comprehend more
than a one-step command.”39 Or that with a mental deficiency, “[h]is foremost desire
is to be compliant and to act appropriately, particularly with authority figures . . . .”40
As one well-known sociologist once put it: “‘Mentally retarded people get through life
by being accommodating whenever there is a disagreement. They’ve learned that they
are often wrong; for them, agreeing is a way of surviving.’ Eliciting a confession from
such people . . . ‘is like taking candy from a baby.’”41
36 Joan Petersilia, Essay, Crime Victims with Developmental Disabilities, 28 CRIM. JUST.
& BEHAV. 655, 685 (2001).
37 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 320 n.25 (2002) (citing Peter Baker, Death-Row
Inmate Gets Clemency; Agreement Ends Day of Suspense, WASH. POST, Jan. 15, 1994, at A1);
see also State v. Edwards, 11 A.3d 116, 131 (Conn. 2011):
It is well established that people with mental illness and mental
deficiencies are more prone than others to confess falsely, either because
of an inordinate desire to accommodate and agree with authority figures
or because they are unable to cope with the psychological intensity of the
police interrogation, which frequently includes the use of sophisticated
ploys and techniques designed to weaken the suspect’s resolve.
38 Singletary v. Fischer, 365 F.Supp. 2d 328, 333 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (The interrogator was
a prosecuting attorney, and the defendant had an IQ of between 60 and 70.); see also State
v. Cumber, 387 N.W.2d 291, 294 (Wis. Ct. App. 1986) (Defendant had subnormal
intelligence and was confused, upset, and crying during the interrogation with the officer.).
39 People v. Braggs, 810 N.E.2d 472, 478–79, 487–88 (Ill. 2003) (Defendant had an IQ
of 54 and could give only “simple answers to direct questions and really did not provide a
narrative of information.”); see also State v. Lopez, 476 S. E. 2d 227, 235 (W. Va. 1996)
(Defendant had the mental capacity of a five-year-old and was unable to understand the right
of silence.).
40 Bailey v. Commonwealth, 194 S.W.3d 296, 301 (Ky. 2006) (“[E]ven though he likely
does not understand the substance of what is being told to him.”); see also State v.
Rettenberger, 984 P.2d 1009, 1019 (Utah 1999) (Defendant had a below-average IQ, suffered
from various disorders, and was “particularly vulnerable to psychological manipulation.”).
41 Jill Smolowe, Untrue Confessions: Mentally Impaired Suspects Sometimes Make False
Admissions. Is Girvies Davis About to Die for One?, TIME, May 22, 1995, at 51. See
generally Paul Marcus, It’s Not Just About Miranda: Determining the Voluntariness of
Confessions in Criminal Prosecutions, 40 VAL. U. L. REV. 601, 633 (2006).
2014] DOES ATKINS MAKE A DIFFERENCE IN NON-CAPITAL CASES? 441
The troubling aspects of confessions here come up chiefly in two ways which
are related, but ultimately distinct: a due process voluntariness claim and a Miranda
waiver issue.
1. Voluntariness
As noted above, individuals with learning disabilities often may not fully under-
stand the interrogation process and may go out of their way to cooperate with the
police, placing themselves in extremely difficult situations.42 Two experienced
researchers—one in special education, the other in psychology—discussed three key
personality traits which lead to these results:
Because individuals with mental retardation frequently ex-
perience repeated failures in social and academic settings, they
often display “outer directed” behavior, relying more on social and
linguistic cues provided by others than on their own problem-
solving abilities . . . . A second characteristic . . . is the strong desire
to please others, particularly those in authority . . . . An additional
response bias common with this population is acquiescence.43
One law enforcement organization described in forceful terms the giving of highly
incriminating statements by mentally retarded suspects: “It is easy to see that ‘persons
with mental retardation are not a major problem for police, but the police may be a
major problem for mentally retarded persons.’”44
The question to consider here is whether there are many reported cases in which
these individuals have confessed and the confessions have been found to be involun-
tary and thus subject to exclusion relying on Atkins. The answer to that question is
no. In fact, after an exhaustive search of the reported cases, my research team could
find relatively few reported cases in which such incriminating statements have been
thrown out. Perhaps, though, this is not surprising, in light of the Supreme Court’s
decision in Colorado v. Connelly.45 There, in a prosecution involving a suspect in
a psychotic state of mind at the time of the interrogation, the majority Justices found
that this person who was suffering from chronic schizophrenia could not claim the
42 See Smolowe, supra note 41.
43 Caroline Everington & Solomon M. Fulero, Competence to Confess: Measuring
Understanding and Suggestibility of Defendants With Mental Retardation, MENTAL RETAR-
DATION, June 1999, at 212, 212–13; see also G.H. Gudjonsson, Theoretical and Empirical
Aspects of Interrogative Suggestibility, in SUGGESTION AND SUGGESTIBILTY 135, 141 (V.A.
Gheorghiu et al. eds., 1989) (discussing correlations of personality traits).
44 Donna M. Praiss, Note, Constitutional Protection of Confessions Made by Mentally
Retarded Defendants, 14 AM. J.L. & MED. 431, 442 (1989) (quoting INTERNATIONAL ASS’N
OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, INC., TRAINING KEY 353, at 2 (1985)).
45 479 U.S. 157 (1986).
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protection of the Due Process Clause.46 The key constitutional question, according
to the Court, was whether the police coerced a statement.47 “Absent police conduct
causally related to the confession” a voluntariness assertion will fail.48 The state and
federal courts have been careful in following this holding:
• “‘[A] defendant’s mental state alone’ is insufficient to ‘render a confes-
sion constitutionally involuntary.’”49
• “The mere showing that a defendant who has confessed to a crime may
have some mental disability is an insufficient basis upon which to ex-
clude the defendant’s statement.”50
• “‘[A] defendant’s mental disability and use of drugs at the time of a con-
fession are also considered, but those factors do not necessarily render
a confession involuntary.’”51
• There are no per se rules against admitting the confession of a mentally
challenged person.52
The Connelly opinion did not conclude that the defendant’s mental ability was
irrelevant to the voluntariness determination, only that by itself the mental disability
would not be determinative.53 That is, if some coercion by the police is found, courts
may consider whether the resulting confession was voluntarily offered in light of the
defendant’s mental illness or ability. Some cases have looked carefully to the rela-
tionship of the mental ability to the coercion and concluded that due process has
been violated. Such cases are, however, relatively few in number.54 Moreover, virtually
46 Id. at 161, 167.
47 Id. at 164.
48 Id. As explained in Dye v. Commonwealth, 411 S.W.3d 227 (Ky. 2013), “the threshold
question to a voluntariness analysis is the presence or absence of coercive [improper] police
activity: ‘coercive police activity is a necessary predicate to the finding that a confession is not
[voluntary] within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.’”
For a good discussion of this aspect of the Supreme Court’s ruling, see generally Paul
T. Hourihan, Note, Earl Washington’s Confession: Mental Retardation and the Law of
Confessions, 81 VA. L. REV. 1471 (1995).
49 State v. Maestas, 272 P.3d 769, 777–78 (Utah Ct. App. 2012).
50 Barrett v. State, 709 S.E.2d 816, 819 (Ga. 2011).
51 State v. Young, 243 P.3d 172, 177 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010) (internal citation omitted).
52 Harden v. State, 59 So. 3d 594, 605 (Miss. 2011).
53 Connelly, 479 U.S. at 165.
54 One of the more prominent of the older decisions on point is Smith v. Duckworth, 910
F.2d 1492 (7th Cir. 1990), where the court wrote:
We recognize of course that mental instability is not itself suf-
ficient to make a confession involuntary. The Supreme Court has made
clear that the voluntariness of a confession does not hinge on a criminal
defendant’s mental state. Instead, the voluntariness of a confession
depends on the level of police coercion. Nonetheless, while a finding
of involuntariness cannot be predicated solely upon Smith’s mental
instability, his mental state is relevant “to the extent it made him more
susceptible to mentally coercive police tactics.”
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none of the reported decisions on either side of the argument choose to discuss or even
mention Atkins. Rather the judges refer to the importance of considering low intelli-
gence, but rarely is it the, or even a, deciding factor. This statement from the Second
Circuit is typical: “‘Relevant factors include . . . the accused’s age, his lack of educa-
tion or low intelligence, the failure to give Miranda warnings, the length of detention,
the nature of the interrogation, and any use of physical punishment.’”55
Perhaps the most notable exception to the pessimistic view of the law regarding
voluntariness comes from a case decided just as this Article was being written. In a
broad and thoughtful opinion by the Ninth Circuit en banc, the court focused on just
the right concerns with a review of the voluntariness question in a case involving a
defendant with an intellectual disability.56 In United States v. Preston, the court
found that the confession of the defendant, an intellectually disabled eighteen-year-
old, was involuntary.57 The crime involved was extremely serious—abusive sexual
contact—and the judges looked to the totality of circumstances in making their
determination.58 Key to the decision, however, was the emphasis placed on the
Id. at 1497 (internal citations omitted); see also United States v. Chrismon, 965 F.2d 1465,
1469 (7th Cir. 1992) (“A diminished mental state is only relevant to the voluntariness inquiry
if it made mental or physical coercion by the police more effective.”).
Of course, even if the judge determines that the statement is admissible as not having
been coerced, a jury may still consider evidence on point. See Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S.
683, 689 (1986) (“[A] defendant’s case may stand or fall on his ability to convince the jury
that the manner in which the confession was obtained casts doubt on its credibility.”).
Evidence can include expert testimony on the question of whether the statement should carry
much weight in light of the defendant’s low intelligence and police actions. For a thoughtful
treatment of the matter, see Hannon v. State, 84 P.3d 320, 349–51 (Wyo. 2004).
55 United States v. Siddiqui, 699 F.3d 690, 707 (2d Cir. 2012). The defendant in Siddiqui
was a suspected terrorist who was shot during capture. Id. at 696. She was interrogated
during her hospital stay and she confessed. Id. at 697. The court held the confession was
voluntarily given. Id. at 707. “Although Siddiqui was at times in pain and medicated, she was
coherent, lucid, and able to carry on a conversation.” Id. at 706. More on point, perhaps, is
Commonwealth v. Wallen, 619 N.E.2d 365, 367 (Mass. App. Ct. 1993):
Nothing appears from the record to indicate that the defendant was
unable to understand any of the procedures. While the judge found that
the defendant has an I.Q. between sixty and seventy, attained only third
or fourth grade reading and writing levels, and is able to recognize few
words of more than three syllables, he also found he could read news-
papers and write letters.
For a discussion of cases in which the courts have been more sympathetic to the claim of
involuntariness with defendants having low mental capacities, see Marcus, supra note 41,
at 633.
56 United States v. Preston, 751 F.3d 1008 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc).
57 Id. at 1008, 1010.
58 To elicit this confession, the police, among other tactics, repeatedly
presented Preston with the choice of confessing to a heinous crime or
to a less heinous crime; rejected his denials of guilt; instructed him on
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suspect’s low intelligence, an IQ of 65, and the fact that the investigating officers
were aware of this from the start of the interrogation.59 In discussing the basic stan-
dards of analysis with a voluntariness claim,60 the decision focused on the need for
the law to regard the significance of the disability of the defendant.
These principles have particular application where, as here, the
individual interrogated is of unusually low intelligence. “What
would be overpowering to the weak of will or mind might be ut-
terly ineffective against an experienced criminal.” So, although
low intelligence does not categorically make a confession invol-
untary, it is “relevant . . . in establishing a setting” in which police
coercion may overcome the will of a suspect. The American Bar
Association’s Criminal Justice Mental Health Standards summa-
rize this point well: “Official conduct that does not constitute im-
permissible coercion when employed with nondisabled persons
may impair the voluntariness of the statements of persons who
are mentally ill or mentally retarded.”61
While the judges certainly did take into account the various techniques used by the
police here, there can be little doubt that the determinative factor as to voluntariness
was the intellectual disability of the defendant.
We begin with “[c]onsideration of [Preston’s] reduced mental
capacity,” a factor that is “critical because it [may] render[] him
more susceptible to subtle forms of coercion.”. . . .
The types of deception used here, which primarily related to
considerations extrinsic to the suspect’s guilt or innocence, are
particularly problematic when used on a person with an intellec-
tual disability . . . . “Because of their cognitive deficits and
the responses they would accept; and fed him the details of the crime
to which they wanted him to confess.
Id. at 1010.
59 Preston’s mother said that a doctor told her that Preston had a “small
brain, like a five-year-old.” Psychological evaluations conducted dur-
ing the course of this litigation show that Preston has “exceptionally
limited linguistic ability,” and “significant problems with verbal com-
munication and comprehension.” The district court found that he had
“deficits in general linguistic and academic skills and low IQ.”
Id.
60 Id. at 1017 (citing Smith v. Duckworth, 910 F.2d 1492, 1497 (7th Cir. 1990)).
61 Id. at 1016–17 (internal citations omitted).
2014] DOES ATKINS MAKE A DIFFERENCE IN NON-CAPITAL CASES? 445
limited social skills, the mentally retarded . . . often lack the
ability to appreciate the seriousness of a situation.” “Under
interrogation, they are not likely to understand that the police
detective who appears to be friendly is really their adversary or
to comprehend the long-term consequences of making an in-
criminating statement.” They fail “to understand the context in
which interrogation occurs, the legal consequences embedded in
the rules or the significance of confessing.” In particular, re-
search shows that the intellectually disabled are “significantly
more likely . . . to believe the suspect will be allowed to go
home after making a confession” to a serious crime. So being
told falsely that, after a confession, one could simply “move on,”
or that the confession would be kept confidential, is likely to
have a considerably greater impact on a person with serious in-
tellectual impairments, such as Preston, than on an individual of
normal intelligence.62
The Ninth Circuit’s analysis would seemingly be required when viewed under the
Atkins ruling. The court did not give the defendant any sort of free pass on the issue
of voluntariness. It did, however, emphasize the fact of his intellectual disability
quite appropriately in making the necessary determination. Would that other courts
follow this approach.
2. Waiver of Miranda
We come now to an area where the disconnect between mental health profes-
sionals and judges could not be more stark: the ability of individuals with low in-
telligence to understand their Miranda rights. To be blunt about this, often judges
appear to be somewhat dismissive of attorneys’ claims focusing on the low intelli-
gence of their clients. Judges often find a valid waiver because of the judicial reli-
ance on other circumstances such as experience of the defendants in the criminal
justice system, and the apparent understanding of the warnings by the suspects. This
occurs even when professionals in the field strongly caution against just such reli-
ance on surrounding circumstances.
As written by Justice O’Connor for the Court, a valid waiver requires an
evaluation of two elements.63 That second element—unlike what was seen above
with the due process analysis under Colorado v. Connelly64—does not require any
sort of government coercion:
62 Id. at 1020, 1026–27 (internal citations omitted).
63 Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986).
64 See generally Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986).
446 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 23:431
Echoing the standard first articulated in Johnson v. Zerbst,
304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938), Miranda holds that “[t]he defendant
may waive effectuation” of the rights conveyed in the warnings
“provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intel-
ligently.” The inquiry has two distinct dimensions. First, the re-
linquishment of the right must have been voluntary in the sense
that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than
intimidation, coercion, or deceptions. Second, the waiver must
have been made with a full awareness of both the nature of the
right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to
abandon it. Only if the “totality of the circumstances surround-
ing the interrogation” reveals both an uncoerced choice and the
requisite level of comprehension may a court properly conclude
that the Miranda rights have been waived.65
The waiver issue has surfaced repeatedly throughout the life of Miranda, for almost
five decades. Real questions continue to be raised as to whether those even with average
intelligence truly understand the warnings. The most recent research casts doubt on
that optimistic view of such understanding. “While the general public and criminal
attorneys may implicitly believe that ‘everyone knows their Miranda rights,’ the
current findings raise questions whether this knowledge is cursory—or even illusory—
for a significant number of criminal defendants and their educated counterparts.”66
Such research, however, is rarely cited by trial or appeals courts in determining
the validity of a waiver by a suspect with an intellectual disability, though the issue
is often raised. Rather, the usual statement looks something like this: “[Al]though
a defendant’s subnormal IQ is a factor to consider in determining the voluntariness
of a waiver of rights, subnormal IQ does not eliminate the possibility of a voluntary
65 Moran, 475 U.S. at 421 (internal citations omitted). As one thoughtful commentator
observed:
Although the Miranda process focuses primarily on factual
understanding of the words of the warning, a waiver of rights also
involves the ability to make rational decisions and to appreciate the
consequences of relinquishing them. Simply understanding the abstract
words of a Miranda warning may not enable a person to exercise the
rights effectively.
Barry C. Feld, Juveniles’ Competence to Exercise Miranda Rights: An Empirical Study of
Policy and Practice, 91 MINN. L. REV. 26, 43 (2006). For an excellent discussion of the
mental health professionals’ understanding of the waiver matter, as discussed further below,
see generally Solomon M. Fulero & Caroline Everington, Mental Retardation, Competency
to Waive Miranda Rights, and False Confessions, in INTERROGATIONS, CONFESSIONS, AND
ENTRAPMENT 163 (G. Daniel Lassiter ed., 2004).
66 Richard Rogers et al., “Everyone Knows Their Miranda Rights”: Implicit Assumptions
and Countervailing Evidence, 16 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 300, 317 (2010).
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waiver.”67 And, if other circumstances are present, judges will rely on those circum-
stances—age, educational level, experience, etc.68—to find a waiver to be proper. In
attempting to give a balanced view of the caselaw, I should note that my research
team was able to locate cases deeming the intellectually disabled defendant’s waiver
insufficient.69 It was, however, far easier to find cases in which the waivers by such
defendants were viewed as constitutionally adequate. Consider, for instance, these
representative cases allowing for the waiver of rights. The first comes from the North
Carolina Court of Appeals, in 2012. There the defendant, with an IQ of 68, was seen
to have properly waived, with much emphasis placed on his prior experience:
The record reveals defendant was familiar with the criminal
justice system, having four prior convictions, two of which were
felony offenses. . . . In addition, although there is evidence in the
record documenting defendant’s limited mental capacity, the
record in no way indicates defendant was confused at any time
during the custodial interrogation, that he did not understand any
67 People v. Creamer, 492 N.E.2d 923, 928 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986). The defendant had an IQ
of 60; his waiver was held to be valid, with “the trial court specifically [finding] that the
defendant was not confused concerning his right to an attorney.” Id. at 926, 928.
68 For an excellent discussion, see Cloud et al., supra note 18. The court in State v.
Lawrence, No. W-2013-00549-CCA-R9-CD, 2014 WL 280385, slip op. at 5, explained:
Among the circumstances courts have considered are the defen-
dant’s age, background, level of functioning, reading and writing skills,
prior experience with the criminal justice system, demeanor, respon-
siveness to questioning, possible malingering, and the manner, detail,
and language in which the Miranda rights are explained. As a result,
courts tend to reach results that are somewhat fact-specific.
69 See, e.g., United States v. Jennings, 491 F. Supp. 2d 1072, 1078 (M.D. Ala. 2007) (The
testimony of the expert mental health professional, unrebutted, was that the defendant “did
not understand his Miranda rights, or the consequences of waiving them, at the time of his
waivers.”); People v. Daniels, 908 N.E.2d 1104, 1130–33 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009) (Interviews
with defendant demonstrated overwhelmingly that she did not understand the difference
between “remain” and “silent” in her Miranda warnings, and did not comprehend that she
was not required to waive her right to remain silent.); Bailey v. Commonwealth, 194 S.W.3d
296, 303 (Ky. 2006):
Moreover, the nature and substance of Bailey’s responses made
clear that he was seriously mentally deficient. Bailey referred to an
attorney as “an atturnity”; he responded that a “vagina” is “where a girl
goes to the bathroom”; he was unable to accurately relay his Miranda
rights mere minutes after Bruner had explained them; he had difficulty
following directions to write a two-digit number on a piece of paper; he
was unable to write his name in cursive; he wavered for several min-
utes when asked his year of birth; he understood his right to counsel as
meaning that he was “in trouble.”
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of the rights as they were read to him, or that he was unable to
comprehend the ramifications of his statements. Indeed, “evi-
dence of the defendant’s below-average intelligence and his
previous psychological problems do not compel suppression of
the statement.”70
Having an expert testify that the defendant seemed to understand some of the Miranda
warnings moved the court in another very recent state case.
At the suppression hearing, Dr. Weinstein testified that he
administered the Spanish version of the IQ tests to Albarran, that
he determined from the results of those tests that Albarran’s IQ was
71, and that it was his opinion that Albarran was mildly mentally
retarded. He admitted on cross-examination that Albarran was
depressed and that that would affect his IQ scores. He further
testified that Albarran did, in fact, understand some of the Miranda
rights. The State presented evidence indicating that Albarran was
the manager of a restaurant and regularly conducted business
without trouble. Further, each right set out in Miranda was read
to Albarran separately and after each right was read, Albarran was
asked if he understood that particular right.71
In a 2013 decision, this court looked to information beyond expert opinion in accept-
ing the waiver of the defendant, a person with an IQ of 67:
The inquiry about a defendant’s ability to understand Miranda
is not limited to expert opinion. Courts are able to consider many
sources of information, not only expert testimony, in making the
determination as to whether a mildly mentally retarded person
is capable of understanding and waiving the Miranda rights. For
example, testimony from the interviewing government agents is
evidence that may help satisfy the burden of proving understand-
ing . . . . As noted above, the expert opinions were, at best,
mixed on the issue of defendant’s capacity to understand and
waive his Miranda rights. The officers testified that they were
convinced that defendant understood his rights and chose to
waive them.72
70 State v. Robinson, 729 S.E.2d 88, 97 (N.C. Ct. App. 2012) (internal citations omitted).
71 Albarran v. State, 96 So. 3d 131, 153–54 (Ala. Crim. App. 2011) (internal citation
omitted), cert. denied, 96 So. 3d 216 (Ala. 2012) and cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 657 (2012).
72 State v. Grady, 108 So. 3d 845, 852 (La. Ct. App. 2013).
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This brief cataloguing is not offered to suggest that it is a rarity for a court in the
reported decisions to find invalid the waiver of a person with an intelligence disabil-
ity. Certainly such cases can be located as indicated above.73 Yet, in reviewing the
reported cases from both state and federal courts, it became clear that findings of
invalidity are the exception rather than the rule even with defendants of extremely
low intelligence. Is the low level of intelligence important, and do the courts look
to that low level? Yes it is, and of course the courts do. Still, one is struck that with
other circumstances present—and there are always other circumstances present—
intellectual disability is yet again not the determinative factor.74 And, once more, the
cases simply do not even mention either the holding or the rationale of the Supreme
Court in Atkins.
Perhaps, though, this is being too rough on the judiciary here; maybe the empiri-
cal evidence shows that suspects who are intellectually disabled really do understand
their rights and knowingly give them up. The evidence, however, is exactly to the
contrary. That is, the empirical research—rarely relied upon by the courts in their
reported decisions—shows that many individuals simply do not understand the
warnings and the significance of waiving their rights.75 A non-mental health publica-
tion described the base for Miranda understanding, in lay person’s terms:
73 See Marcus, supra note 41, at 633.
74 This exchange between psychology Professor George Baroff, former Chief Justice
James Exum of the North Carolina Supreme Court, and practicing lawyer Richard Burr of
Houston is telling. While the dialogue took place two decades ago, there is little evidence
that much has changed since then, except for the Atkins decision.
PROFESSOR BAROFF: I have been struck, in the cases I have
been involved with, as to how extraordinarily distorted understanding
of their Miranda warning has been for people who have confessed to
crimes—some of whom have been charged with first degree murder,
and some of whom are on death row.
JUDGE EXUM: I think the courts are very concerned with
whether people who waive their Miranda rights do so knowingly and
understandingly.
MR. BURR: In death penalty cases and in many serious felony
prosecutions, confessions have several consequences. If they are com-
plete confessions and found to be credible by the police, they cut short
further police investigation. They will cut off consideration of other
suspects. They will cause the police to shape the evidence around the
person who has confessed. In death cases, if there is a confession, it is
the center piece of the State’s case.
People with mental retardation don’t usually have the ability to
argue with the police on their understanding of their Miranda rights. It
seems to me that issues concerning the knowing and understanding of
Miranda warnings are major and have not been addressed to any major
extent by the Courts.
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, supra note 25, at 37.
75 See generally Fulero & Everington, supra note 65.
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Experts have determined that the Miranda warnings are written
at a 7th grade reading level. While a small percentage of individ-
uals at the upper end of functioning of mental retardation (IQ of
60–70) may be able to read at a 6th grade level, most will read
at a significantly lower level. This means that even those who
are at the upper level of functioning, formerly classified as
“mild” mental retardation, will have great difficulty understand-
ing Miranda warnings.76
And that difficulty in understanding becomes ever more acute when—as is the usual
situation—the warnings are not read by the suspects, but are spoken to the suspects
upon arrest or custody by police officers.
The President’s Committee on Mental Retardation echoed this view:
A fundamental right in the American system of justice is that at
the point at which a person is arrested, he or she must be notified
of Miranda rights, i.e., the right not to answer questions and the
right to counsel. This poses particular problems in the case of of-
fenders with mental retardation. A rapid recitation of the Miranda
warning, which contains a number of complicated provisions, may
be dimly comprehended by the offender or may not be under-
stood at all.77
The leading research makes the broad point strongly.
A statistical comparison of the two groups indicated that persons
with mental retardation were significantly more likely to receive
a score of zero on the Comprehension of Miranda Rights state-
ments. . . .
[I]t is clear that individuals with mental retardation have
significant problems in comprehension of the Miranda warning. In
fact, significantly more persons with mental [ ] retardation than
without mental retardation . . . did not meet minimum criteria for
competence. In addition, significantly more persons with mental
retardation did not understand any of the substantive portions of
76 TEXAS APPLESEED & HOUS. ENDOWMENT, OPENING THE DOOR: JUSTICE FOR DEFEN-
DANTS WITH MENTAL RETARDATION, A HANDBOOK FOR ATTORNEYS PRACTICING IN TEXAS
15 (2005) [hereinafter OPENING THE DOOR]. “Most individuals with mental retardation attain,
at best, a 4th grade level of reading.” Id.
77 REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, supra note 25, at 8.
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this warning . . . suggest[ing] that there is a high likelihood that
individuals with mental retardation may not understand the
notion of self-incrimination nor the advising role of an attorney
in the interrogation process.78
How then does one connect the reality of lack of understanding by many
suspects to the caution given, above, by the Supreme Court in requiring that “the
waiver must have been made with a full awareness of both the nature of the right
being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it?”79 Or, tying
that reality of understanding to the Atkins opinion’s strong position that “[m]entally
retarded persons . . . . [b]ecause of their impairments, however, by definition . . .
have diminished capacities to understand and process information.”80 The sad truth
78 Everington & Fulero, supra note 43, at 216–17. The research was published in 1999, but
more recent work parallels these findings. See Nevins-Saunders, supra note 21, at 1091–93;
see also Cloud et al., supra note 18, at 531 (“Our study reveals that despite a suspect’s prior
experience with the police and the warnings, or his age and education, a mentally retarded
person will not understand all of the Miranda warnings and their legal significance.”).
79 Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986). The Illinois Supreme Court explained
further:
If intelligent knowledge in the Miranda context means anything,
it means the ability to understand the very words used in the warning.
It need not mean the ability to understand far-reaching legal and strategic
effects of waiving one’s rights, or to appreciate how widely or deeply
an interrogation may probe, or to withstand the influence of stress or
fancy; but to waive rights intelligently and knowingly, one must at least
understand basically what those rights encompass and minimally what
their waiver will entail.
People v. Bernasco, 562 N.E.2d 958, 964 (Ill. 1990); see also United States v. Gillenwater,
717 F.3d 1070, 1080 (9th Cir. 2013) (“[There is a] general presumption against waiver of
constitutional rights, and the requirement [is] that such waiver be ‘knowing and intentional.’”
(footnote omitted)). Of course, the powerful statement as to waiver in Moran v. Burbine must be
tempered by the Court’s more recent decision in Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370 (2010).
There, the majority held that a defendant must invoke the Miranda rights “unambiguously.”
Id. at 381. Waiver was found when the defendant “knowingly and voluntarily” made a state-
ment to the police. Id. at 387. The dissent’s response was quite marked:
Today’s decision turns Miranda upside down. Criminal suspects must
now unambiguously invoke their right to remain silent—which, counter-
intuitively, requires them to speak. At the same time, suspects will be
legally presumed to have waived their rights even if they have given no
clear expression of their intent to do so.
Id. at 412 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
80 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 318 (2002). As the Court put it in a non-Miranda
case, a valid confession must be the product of a “rational intellect and a free will.”
Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 208 (1960). Can a waiver be valid, or can a confession
be voluntary when the suspect cannot truly understand the import of her statement or the
meaning of the officer’s words? It is difficult indeed to give an affirmative answer.
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is that no such connection or tie can be made; I agree with the many researchers who
have concluded that—in spite of the strong language of the judges and Justices in
numerous cases, including Atkins—those with learning disabilities and low IQ numbers
are at an extreme disadvantage during the interrogation process.
III. ASSISTING COUNSEL: GUILTY PLEAS, TRIALS
The standard for competence to stand trial is not very substantial.81 An individual
with a low level of intelligence seemingly is often able to satisfy the requirement
that he has “‘sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable
degree of rational understanding’” and “‘a rational as well as factual understanding of
the proceedings against him.’”82 Suppose, though, that someone can meet that limited
standard.83 Does that person necessarily have sufficient intelligence and understanding
to truly assist a lawyer in deciding whether to accept a plea offer, or to aid in planning
for a full trial? One commentator has suggested that there really are two forms of
81 Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 420 (1960) (per curiam).
82 Id. at 402; see also Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171 (1975) (“It has long been
accepted that a person whose mental condition is such that he lacks the capacity to under-
stand the nature and object of the proceedings against him, to consult with counsel, and to
assist in preparing his defense may not be subjected to a trial.”).
83 One commentator explained:
The practical result is that even in adult courts, defendants need only
display a minimal capacity. These cases give little guidance for lower
courts to implement the competency determinations, giving judges a
considerable amount of discretion on the matter. Dusky’s factual under-
standing requirement focuses more on the defendant’s ability to learn
about possible pleas, penalties, and litigation in general, than on whether
the information is ever adequately processed and understood. The stan-
dard focuses on the defendant’s ability and not the actual comprehension
of the information. Rational understanding, another requirement under
Dusky, examines whether the defendant can comprehend the conse-
quences of the trial process, which may become difficult if the defen-
dant is lacking in their factual understanding of the proceedings.
With regard to the third consideration developed in Dusky/Drope,
whether the defendants can properly assist their attorney, courts often
look for three types of abilities. The first examines the defendant’s
ability to communicate information to counsel in order to properly prepare
a defense. The second requires the defendant to achieve a rational under-
standing of the attorney’s function and services within the context of
the proceedings. The third requires that the defendant possess the ability
to decide whether or not to plead guilty or if certain constitutional rights
should be asserted. These abilities require a somewhat sophisticated
understanding of court proceedings and their implications, as well as the
capacity to understand and assist in making strategic legal decisions.
Murphy, supra note 26, at 380–81 (footnotes omitted).
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competency that ought to be considered by the criminal courts.84 The first, as noted
above, is whether the defendant can even be tried.85 The second, “decisional compe-
tency,” is seen as just as important, linking to defense strategies and “rational manip-
ulation of information.”86 Here the question is whether the defendant really does have
the ability to assist counsel in any meaningful way.87 This question is especially
pertinent in this context for a few reasons, though not recognized by the courts
generally. First, the vast majority of criminal cases are disposed of in negotiation.88
Second, the concepts which will be so vital to a plea deal may be particularly diffi-
cult for a person of low intelligence to grasp.89
84 Bonnie, supra note 27, at 425–26.
85 Id. at 424.
86 Id. at 435.
87 Id. at 419.
88 Oren Gazal-Ayal & Avishalom Tor, The Innocence Effect, 62 DUKE L.J. 339, 341
(2012). The authors estimate—consistent with the language of the Supreme Court—that
“about 95 percent of felony convictions follow guilty pleas, and [that] most guilty pleas
result from plea bargaining” in both federal and state courts. Other commentators agree. See,
e.g., Lucian E. Dervan, Bargained Justice: Plea-Bargaining’s Innocence Problem and the
Brady Safety-Valve, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 51 (2012) (stating ninety percent of criminal defen-
dants waived their right to trial and confessed their guilt in court in the 1960s); Jacqueline
E. Ross, The Entrenched Position of Plea Bargaining in United States Legal Practice, 54
AM. J. COMP. L. 717 (2006) (“In the criminal justice systems of the 50 states, over 95 percent
of all criminal justice cases are disposed of without a trial, through the entry of a guilty plea.”).
This is hardly a recent development. Almost seventy years ago, Justice Frankfurter noted that
“most incarcerations are upon pleas of guilty.” Foster v. Illinois, 332 U.S. 134, 138 (1947).
The guilty plea process has come under increasing scrutiny after the Supreme Court’s deci-
sions in Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1380 (2012), and Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct.
1399 (2012) (holding that counsel must, under the Sixth Amendment, provide effective
assistance at the guilty plea negotiation stage). Russell D. Covey, Plea-Bargaining Law After
Lafler and Frye, 51 DUQ. L. REV. 595 (2013); see Bruce A. Green, The Right to Plea Bargain
with Competent Counsel After Cooper and Frye: Is the Supreme Court Making the Ordinary
Criminal Process “Too Long, Too Expensive, and Unpredictable . . . In Pursuit of Perfect
Justice”?, 51 DUQ. L. REV. 735 (2013) (“The cases occasioned doctrinal disagreement about
whether the Sixth Amendment offers a cure when a defendant misses out on a favorable plea
bargain because his lawyer failed to meet professional standards.”). One commentator nicely
explained the tremendous significance of the two decisions:
Though plea bargaining had been acknowledged by the Court as a
“critical stage” of the proceedings well before Padilla, Frye, and Lafler
were decided, the Court’s recognition of the dominance of plea bar-
gaining means that plea bargaining is not simply one of many critical
stages; it is the only critical stage.
John P. Gross, What Matters More: A Day in Jail or a Criminal Conviction?, 22 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 55, 79 (2013).
89 See Ira Mickenberg, Competency to Stand Trial and the Mentally Retarded Defendant:
The Need for a Multi-Disciplinary Solution to a Multi-Disciplinary Problem, 17 CAL. W. L.
REV. 365, 396 (1981) (stating that mentally retarded people’s tendency to interpret actions
in moral absolutes interferes with their reasoning abilities).
454 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 23:431
After substantial research efforts, my research team could not locate any cases
in the 21st century in which a court found a defendant competent to stand trial but
because of low intelligence not able to enter a plea or assist her lawyer. Instead the
relatively few cases in which the claim is made have judges deciding that once the
defendant has been deemed competent to stand trial, she will necessarily be found
capable of assisting counsel. Not many cases have explored this matter in depth,90
and—after extensive research—none could be found which even mentioned the
relevance of Atkins. This seems odd, for the Supreme Court has indicated that a plea
must be intelligent and knowing with “nothing to indicate that [the defendant is]
incompetent or otherwise not in control of his [or her] mental faculties,” is “aware
of the nature of the charge[s],” and is “advised by competent counsel.”91 To be sure,
the defendant must have the capacity “to make rational decisions during the course
of trial, testify and respond rationally to cross-examination, and withstand the
extreme stress of trial situation.”92 And, of course, the Atkins Court itself understood
90 The standard principle is stated in State v. Zachery, No. 2004CA00091, 2004 WL
2676321, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 22, 2004) (“‘The competency standard for pleading
guilty or waiving the right to counsel is the same as the competency standard for standing
trial: whether the defendant has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a
reasonable degree of rational understanding and a rational as well as factual understanding
of the proceedings.’ In the case sub judice, following a competency hearing, the trial court
found appellant competent to stand trial. Therefore, it would also reason that appellant was
competent to enter a guilty plea.”). Many cases make a similar point. See United States v.
Pruitt, 429 F. App’x 155, 157–58 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 431 (2011); Snoddy
v. United States, Nos. 2:08-cv-8044-JHH-PWG, 2:07-cr-0069-JHH-PWG, 2012 WL 1745591
(N.D. Ala. Apr. 20, 2012); Thompson v. State, 88 So. 3d 312, 321 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012),
review denied, 107 So. 3d 407 (2012); Wills v. State, 321 S.W.3d 375, 379 (Mo. Ct. App.
2010); Hobdy v. State, No. 06-03-00160-CR, 2004 WL 1444648, at *1–*3 (Tex. Ct. App.
June 25, 2004). But see People v. Bell, No. 282545, 2009 WL 723835, at *1–*2 (Mich. Ct.
App. Mar. 19, 2009); Thomas v. State, 249 S.W.3d 234, 239 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008); State v.
Hartman, 881 N.E.2d 891, 895–97 (Ohio Ct. App. 2007). For a general discussion, see
Sandoval-Vega v. State, 384 S.W.3d 508, 514–15 (Ark. 2011).
91 Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 756 (1970).
92 Ira Mickenberg, Competency to Stand Trial and the Mentally Retarded Defendant: The
Need for a Multi-Disciplinary Solution to a Multi-Disciplinary Problem, 17 CAL. W. L. REV.
365, 387 (1981). One especially frank judge—former Chief Justice of the North Carolina
Supreme Court Exum—recounted a most difficult event, one that he recalled many years later:
The competency issue, particularly with respect to the guilty plea,
is troublesome. I recall when I was on the trial bench that a young
defendant wanted to plead guilty. He was represented by counsel. I was
going through all of the questions that trial judges ask to ensure that the
defendant understands the pleas. The trial judge must make sure that
the defendant understands what he is doing when he enters his guilty
plea, that he understands that he is waiving certain rights, particularly
the right to trial by jury. I asked this defendant if he was willing to
waive his right to a jury trial. He said, “Yes, your honor,” and waved
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the point in writing that “mentally retarded defendants may be less able to give
meaningful assistance to their counsel.”93 The view, then, is that competence to stand
trial may be different from being sufficiently capable to communicate with counsel
in determining an appropriate plea offer or whether to raise a defense in a trial. The
President’s Committee on Mental Retardation stated the matter succinctly: “[A] de-
fendant may be able to assist his or her attorney and stand trial, yet not be competent
to plead guilty because of imperfect understanding of the effects of pleading guilty
and available alternatives.”94 Even after Atkins, however, the matter has not been
his hands. Nobody suggested, nor did it occur to me, that he might be
mentally retarded.
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, supra note 25, at 38. This statement by Chief Justice Exum surely
gives strong support for one commentator’s proposal of a dialogue with Miranda warnings:
This Article proposes a new “dialogue approach” to resolve this
tension [ed. warnings versus suspect’s actual awareness] and limit the
ambiguity in disputed waivers, especially for vulnerable suspects. The
dialogue approach would require suspects to confirm their understanding
of the rights and the consequences of the waiver by restating the rights
in their own words at the time of the interrogation. In addition, it would
require a brief interchange between the police and the suspect about the
purpose of rights and the roles of the participants in the interrogation.
It changes the Miranda waiver process from a one-way presentation to
a two-way dialogue.
Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, The Dialogue Approach to Miranda Warnings and Waiver, 49
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1437, 1439 (2012). I applaud this proposal, as this approach would
demonstrate with some clarity that individuals with intellectual disabilities might have genu-
ine problems understanding the basic warnings and expressing their views concerning them.
93 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 320 (2002); Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011,
2032 (2010) (sentencing juvenile offenders to life in prison without parole for a nonhomicide
crime violates the Eighth Amendment).
94 REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, supra note 25, at 10; see also Joan Petersilia, Doing
Justice? Criminal Offenders with Developmental Disabilities, 2 CORRECTIONAL MENTAL
HEALTH REP. 65 (2001). The argument has never been accepted by the courts, as explained
by one thoughtful commentator:
Nevertheless, professional evaluators have struggled with the ap-
plication of the general competency standards to individual defendants.
With a competency standard that speaks in terms of a reasonable degree
of rational understanding, the inquiry is by its nature flexible and context
dependent. But even though it would seem that there may be degrees
of competency, where a defendant is capable of making some decisions,
but not others, the Supreme Court has made it clear that competency is
an either/or proposition. A defendant is either competent or he is not
for all adjudicative proceedings, including the right to waive counsel
or to plead guilty.
Mary Sue Backus, Achieving Fundamental Fairness for Oklahoma’s Juveniles: The Role for
Competency in Juvenile Proceedings, 65 OKLA. L. REV. 41, 46–47 (2012) (citing Godinez
v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 398–401 (1993) (“[W]e reject the notion that competence to plead
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explored seriously other than in scholarly works. This is true for the plea process,
and also for the trial itself. And, participating in decisions as to the trial may be even
more difficult for the defendant with an intellectual disability. “When persons with
MR do go to trial, their ability to remember details, locate witnesses, and testify credi-
bly is limited. Defense attorneys believe they make less-than-ideal defendants and
are easily manipulated by prosecutors pretending to be on their side.”95 I am not sug-
gesting that intellectually disabled defendants could not ever plead guilty. However,
in such cases there ought to be a much stronger record as to their understanding of
the process and consequences and considerably more involvement by the trial judge
to ensure that rights are being protected.
IV. SENTENCING
If there is one area where one would imagine that Atkins has likely had a major
impact—apart from capital prosecutions—it would seem to be with sentencing. After
all, Atkins was all about sentencing—albeit in the death penalty context—and the
Court was quite explicit in finding that mentally retarded defendants were less culpa-
ble than others. “Mentally retarded persons . . . . have diminished capacities to under-
stand and process information . . . . Their deficiencies do not warrant an exemption
from criminal sanctions, but they do diminish their personal culpability . . . . [T]oday
our society views mentally retarded offenders as categorically less culpable than the
average criminal.”96 Just about everyone working in the field who speaks to the matter
seems to believe that the diminished intelligence of the offender ought to be a major
factor in determining appropriate sentences.97 And I do mean just about everyone
here, including:
• The ABA Criminal Justice Section.98
guilty or to waive the right to counsel must be measured by a standard that is higher than (or
even different from) the Dusky standard.”)). The conclusion, though, may not be quite so
clear in light of the Court’s decision in Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164 (2008). There the
Justices held that the standards for competency to stand trial and competency to represent
oneself are not necessarily always the same. Id. at 164. In deciding whether an individual
could represent herself, a trial judge may “take realistic account of the particular defendant’s
mental capacities.” Id. at 177. In doing so, the trial judge could determine the strong interest
in a fair trial outweighs the usual Sixth Amendment right of self-representation. Id. at 178.
95 Petersilia, supra note 19, at 37.
96 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316.
97 See infra notes 98–100 and accompanying text.
98 See CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION STANDARDS § 7-9.3 (1989) (“Evidence of mental illness
or mental retardation should be considered as a possible mitigating factor in sentencing a
convicted offender.”). The ABA commentary strongly recommends that “seriously retarded
offenders should be treated in mental retardation facilities instead of correctional institutions”
and remarks that “it is inconceivable that profoundly retarded individuals will be subjected 
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• The President’s Committee on Mental Retardation.99
• Legal scholars.100
So why, then, when we actually look at the case law on point do we find, at best,
a mixed result, in non-capital cases coming after the Court’s holding? There are
really relatively few sentencing decisions reported which favor low intelligence
defendants.101 It is pretty easy to argue two very different views here as to the reasons
for this. On the one hand, sentencing judges have always—to a certain extent—con-
sidered intellectual disabilities in sentencing, whether in jurisdictions where they are
given free rein, or in places with stringent sentencing guidelines. Atkins simply did
not change that fact. On the other hand, while Atkins may have focused great atten-
tion here in sentencing, at least by legal scholars, almost no cases actually mention
Atkins in the non-capital sentencing arena.102 And, when they do, it is to note that
Atkins is limited to death penalty prosecutions.103
It is certainly true that mental condition has been viewed as important by both
legislators and judges in making sentencing decisions.104 To use the federal system as
illustrative,105 the point is clear. Congress has stated that an appropriate sentence must
to criminal prosecution, and moderately and severely retarded offenders also are most likely
to be screened out at earlier stages of criminal proceedings.” Id. at § 7-9.1 cmt. at 470. We
could uncover no evidence that the commentators are in fact correct with regard to which
offenders are actually subjected to criminal prosecution, and a review of the sentencing
decisions would appear to indicate to the contrary. See infra note 105. Nor could we find any
cases which actually cite to, or rely upon, this ABA recommendation or commentary.
99 REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, supra note 25, at 29, recommending that:
[C]ourts always consider mental retardation and its impact as a
possible mitigating factor and also consider the effect of alternative
dispositions of a case, e.g., confinement, probation, etc., on the individ-
ual with mental retardation . . . . There [should] be a strong presump-
tion that community correction and probation programs are preferable
in the case of offenders with mental retardation.
100 See, e.g., Barkow, supra note 17, at 1145–47; Timothy Cone, Developing the Eighth
Amendment for Those “Least Deserving” of Punishment: Statutory Mandatory Minimums
for Non-Capital Offenses Can Be “Cruel and Unusual” when Imposed on Mentally Retarded
Offenders, 34 N.M. L. REV. 35 (2004); Nevins-Saunders, supra note 21, at 1108. Professor
Stephen Morse of the University of Pennsylvania has long argued that such low intelligence
offenders are less culpable and ought to be subject to a “guilty but partially responsible”
judgment. See Stephen J. Morse, Diminished Rationality, Diminished Responsibility, 1 OHIO
ST. J. CRIM. L. 289 (2003).
101 See infra notes 105, 111 and accompanying text.
102 See infra notes 105–11 and accompanying text.
103 See infra notes 123–37 and accompanying text.
104 See infra notes 111–23.
105 I rely here upon federal law. See infra note 111. State principles, as reflected in the
case law, though, are similar. These recent state cases also follow the federal approach in recog-
nizing the relevance of intellectual disabilities while not using them as much of a mitigating
factor generally:
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be one which is able “to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for
the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense.”106 In a recent survey of U.S.
District Court Judges, the respondents overwhelmingly indicated that the defendant’s
mental condition should be considered in passing sentence.107 Seventy-nine percent of
the judges agreed that both mental condition and diminished capacity are “Ordinarily
Relevant to Departure and/or Variance Consideration.”108 Little is made, however, of
low intelligence, though the U.S. Supreme Court has held that “impaired intellectual
• Commonwealth v. Parsons, 969 A.2d 1259, 1269, 1272 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2009)
(In giving a lower sentence, trial judge focused heavily on the defendant’s
extremely low IQ—between 50 and 60; reversed on appeal because the judge
“unilaterally countermanded the (tougher plea) agreement.”).
• State v. Burgess, 965 So. 2d 621, 623 (La. Ct. App. 2007) (Defendant’s mental
retardation offset at sentencing by other factors, as the defendant “is mildly
mentally retarded, [but] he is not so deficient that he is unable to work or main-
tain a relation with the victim’s mother.”).
• State v. Valdovinos, 82 P.3d 1167, 1172–73 (Utah Ct. App. 2003) (Despite a
showing of low intelligence, defendant’s consecutive sentences for robbery
upheld because of violent commission.).
• State v. White, 792 So. 2d 146, 155 (La. Ct. App. 2001) (Proper sentence of low
intelligence offender when the trial judge “took into account the sentencing
guidelines and he recited the aggravating and mitigating factors for the record.
Thus, he particularized the sentence to the offender and the offense.”).
There are, of course, some notable exceptions—though they are not numerous. Here are two:
• State v. Williams, 870 So. 2d 938, 939 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004). The state
appealed from a sentencing order, arguing that a downward departure of time
was not justified. Id. The appeals judges strongly supported the trial judge’s
decision. Id. “There was ample evidence that the defendant suffers from dimin-
ished mental capacity as well as significant physical problems. The defendant
scored 68 and 70 on his IQ tests. [The defendant] has memory, concentration and
attention problems.” Id. 
• State v. L.V., 979 A.2d 821, 835 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2009) (The trial
judge exercised his discretion and sentenced the defendant to a higher crime
than could have been ordered. The defendant had an IQ of “between forty-four
and seventy-five.”). The appeals court found that the trial judge abused his
discretion. Id. at 835. “Does the interest of justice demand that defendant be
sentenced as a third-degree offender? We are clearly convinced that the high
standard governing downgrading is met here . . . . [D]efendant is a person of
very limited intelligence, functioning at a level in school initially below a five-
year-old child.” Id. (The court went on to discuss other factors such as crimes
committed against the defendant as she was growing up).
106 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A) (2006).
107 See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, RESULTS OF SURVEY OF UNITED STATES DISTRICT
JUDGES JANUARY 2010 THROUGH MARCH 2010 tbl. 13 (2010), http://www.ussc.gov/sites
/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/research-projects-and-surveys/surveys/20100608
_Judge_Survey.pdf
108 Id.
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functioning is inherently mitigating.”109 This view is only marginally reflected in fed-
eral case law.110
To be sure, the emphasis throughout is on mental illness or diminished capacity,
not intellectual disability. This point is reflected in the Federal Sentencing Guidelines:
A downward departure may be warranted if (1) the defendant
committed the offense while suffering from a significantly reduced
mental capacity; and (2) the significantly reduced mental capacity
contributed substantially to the commission of the offense. Simi-
larly, if a departure is warranted under this policy statement, the ex-
tent of the departure should reflect the extent to which the reduced
mental capacity contributed to the commission of the offense.
However, the court may not depart below the applicable
guideline range if (1) the significantly reduced mental capacity
was caused by the voluntary use of drugs or other intoxicants;
(2) the facts and circumstances of the defendant’s offense indi-
cate a need to protect the public because the offense involved
actual violence or a serious threat of violence; (3) the defendant’s
criminal history indicates a need to incarcerate the defendant to
protect the public; or (4) the defendant has been convicted of an
109 Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 287 (2004) (In capital prosecutions, the defendant’s
intellectual disability may be relevant to his crime; jury instructions must permit the jury to
weigh mental retardation in the defendant’s favor.).
110 Countless decisions show this to be so. See, e.g., United States v. Vasquez-Cruz, 692
F.3d 1001, 1008–09 (9th Cir. 2012) (limited mental capacity “probably diminishes his ability
to totally function as a person who did not have that type of disability would function,” still
sentence within the “heartland” of the guidelines range was reasonable); United States v.
Maxwell, 664 F.3d 240, 246 (8th Cir. 2011) (district court stated that “if there had been no
mental disability at all . . . I would be closer to 280 to 300 months this morning, not the 222
where I ended up under all of the circumstances”); United States v. Durham, 645 F.3d 883,
898 (7th Cir. 2011) (“[A] defendant must show why a particular personal characteristic, such
as a low IQ, acts as a mitigating factor, as opposed to an aggravating one.”); United States
v. Williams, 553 F.3d 1073, 1085 (7th Cir. 2009) (sentencing judge “should consider [the
defendant’s] actual [intellectual] disability and the combination of his disability with his
susceptibility to manipulation.”); Johnson v. United States, 26 A.3d 758, 763 (D.C. 2011)
(sentencing judges considered the defendant’s intellectual disabilities but concluded that
more weight should be given to the dangerous nature of the crimes committed). While the
discretion of judges today is markedly less broad than prior to the guidelines regime (even
after the Supreme Court decided that they were not to be viewed as mandatory on the district
courts, in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 264 (2005)), that power was never wholly
eliminated. For a good overview of the prior broad reach of the federal guidelines, see Louis
F. Oberdorfer, Mandatory Sentencing: One Judge’s Perspective—2002, 40 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 11 (2003). Judge Oberdorfer, who died in 2013, was a district judge for the District of
Columbia. Id.
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offense under chapter 71, 109A, 110, or 117, of title 18, United
States Code [ed. Obscenity or sexual practices.]111
Few state statutes in any way specifically mention intellectual disabilities or
mental retardation in the criminal justice system.112 However, quite a number of state
laws apparently give sentencing judges the option to consider such disability as a
mitigating factor in passing sentence.113 They do not, however, explicitly so state, as in
the Hawaii law where judges are directed to view “the nature and circumstances of
the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant,”114 or the Idaho
statute which mandates that judges in sentencing look to the defendant’s “mental
condition” if it is a “significant factor,”115 or the Montana law which allows judges
to bypass the mandatory minimum sentence if the offender’s “mental capacity . . .
was significantly impaired, although not so impaired as to constitute a defense to the
prosecution.”116 Direct references to intellectual or developmental disabilities are made
in related statutes such as those which deal with diversion from prosecution as in
California,117 or those which link the disability to the insanity defense as in Maryland118
and Kentucky.119 Such references cannot be found in sentencing statutes.
Two decades ago, concern was expressed by the President’s Committee on
Mental Retardation that “the effects of mental retardation have not been regarded
111 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.13 (2011). It must be noted that the
guidelines only allow for downward departures based on mental condition in the most
extreme cases. Id. §§ 5H1.3, 5K2.0 cmt. 3(C). Moreover, the Commentary to the section
makes clear that “reduced mental capacity” does not involve any sort of Atkins intellectual
disability, but rather is linked to tests for the insanity defense:
“Significantly reduced mental capacity” means the defendant, al-
though convicted, has a significantly impaired ability to (A) understand
the wrongfulness of the behavior comprising the offense or to exercise
the power of reason; or (B) control behavior that the defendant knows
is wrongful.
Id. § 5K2.13 cmt. 1.
112 Many states have sentencing commissions or task forces on sentencing. And, most of
those states also have fairly comprehensive sentencing reports. Those reports discuss many
important aspects of sentencing such as race, gender, age, mental illness, and recidivism
rates. Our research team could not locate a report from a single state which even mentioned
intellectual disability.
113 See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-35-113 (2014).
114 HAW. REV. STAT. § 706-606 (1993).
115 IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-2523 (2013) (As written, however, this section applies to
“Consideration of Mental Illness in Sentencing.”).
116 MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-222 (2011).
117 CAL. PENAL CODE § 1001.22 (West 2014).
118 MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 3-109 (West 2013).
119 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 504.020 (West 2013). Both Kentucky and Maryland have
insanity defense laws which follow the Model Penal Code in finding that the defendant is not
responsible if either the traditional cognitive or volitional element cannot be shown.
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as a mitigating factor in sentencing many offenders with mental retardation who
have been found criminally responsible and competent to stand trial.”120 Years later,
and after the decision in Atkins, it is difficult to see any major changes in the sentenc-
ing landscape regarding mentally disabled defendants. That is, the judge’s sentenc-
ing discretion is still present, and in most reported cases, the discretion does not seem
to be exercised strongly in favor of the mentally challenged offender. While some
scholars121 have been harshly critical of the Supreme Court for not being more actively
engaged in this area—apart from capital prosecutions—little judicial or legislative
energy seems to have been expended in favor of intellectually disabled defendants in
the sentencing context. Indeed, one is struck by how rarely Atkins ever appears in
the reported cases in the non-death penalty sentencing situation. This is especially
120 REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, supra note 25, at 13. The Committee explained further:
The importance of rehabilitation versus other correctional goals
varies in the minds of judges and juries when setting or recommending
sentences. However, the likelihood that a sentence will give significant
weight to a habilitation program for defendants with mental retardation
is reduced for three reasons. First, there is a growing emphasis on punish-
ment rather than rehabilitation for all offenders. Second, the effective-
ness of rehabilitation for offenders is sometimes questioned despite the
existence for a number of successful rehabilitation programs. Third,
appropriate community-based correctional rehabilitation services are
usually not available for offenders with mental retardation.
Id. at 13–14. Some professionals in the field have written, however, that it may not be in the
offender’s best interest to have her intellectual disability brought before the decision maker.
The hesitation here is that this factor may tend to increase, rather than decrease, the resulting
term of imprisonment or the decision for probation. See OPENING THE DOOR, supra note 76,
at 54 (“[The attorney will] need to consider carefully the decision to raise your client’s
mental retardation to the jury [ed., juries in Texas are involved in the sentencing decision].
Some jurors do not understand mental retardation and may believe that ‘mild’ mental
retardation is not a substantial disability. Some jurors may not want your client to be in the
community on probation, because they believe the myth that persons with mental retardation
are more likely to commit crimes. On the other hand, you must remember that failing to raise
the issue of your client’s mental retardation may result either in a probated sentence that your
client cannot comply with or in a period of incarceration that will further damage your client.
As discussed previously, individuals with mental retardation are often victimized in prison.”);
see also Elizabeth Nevins-Saunders, Not Guilty as Charged: The Myth of Mens Rea for
Defendants with Mental Retardation, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1419, 1461 (2012) (“[R]elying
on a judge or jury’s discretion—particularly unfettered discretion—does not guarantee that
justice will be done. Indeed, there may be reason to fear that jurors, or even judges, will
sentence more, rather than less, harshly because of the defendant’s mental retardation if they
have the option to do so. Some have even argued that people with mental retardation are over-
represented in the criminal justice system because key players in the system, including judges
and lawyers, are unsure how to ‘deal with this population in a professional manner.’”).
121 In a singularly strong condemnation, one scholar wrote that the “[Supreme] Court’s
elaborate set of rules for death and its virtually nonexistent role in overseeing any other
criminal sentence” made little sense as a matter of policy. Barkow, supra note 17, at 1147.
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troubling because the Eighth Amendment applies to all sentencing instances, not
simply those involving a death sentence.122 To be sure, the most prominent decisions
here show how little Atkins matters; these cases specifically reference Atkins but
each—without hesitation—denies its application in the non-capital setting:
• United States v. Whidbee.123 The court responded to the defense argument
that the lengthy sentence of an intellectually disabled defendant was un-
constitutional under Atkins by writing that the case “does not support
Whidbee’s argument because Atkins addressed a capital sentence. Capital
sentences are treated differently under the Eighth Amendment. . . . [There
is a] ‘qualitative difference between death and all other penalties.’”124
• United States v. Laffoon.125 Rejecting the argument that a mandatory
minimum sentence for a firearms conviction violated the Constitution,
the court would not apply Atkins. “With the exception of a capital sen-
tence, the imposition of a mandatory sentence without consideration of
mitigating factors does not violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment.”126
• Joshua v. Adams.127 25-year-to-life sentence for a person suffering from
schizophrenia under the California “Three Strikes” law—for stealing two
bottles of alcohol—did not contravene Atkins, for that case “dealt with
capital sentences and [is] therefore distinguishable. Absent a Supreme
Court decision clearly establishing that mental illness renders a non-capital
sentence unconstitutional, we are unable to grant Joshua habeas relief.”128
• United States v. Gibbs.129 Life imprisonment for defendant convicted of
violent crime could not—under Federal Sentencing Guidelines—be
given mitigation due to his intellectual disability; sentence upheld even
though the defendant relied heavily on Atkins. “Atkins involved policy
concerns about the death penalty and not generalized sentencing.”130
122 The courts have often looked to the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause in non-capital
cases. In one of the most prominent decisions, the Supreme Court in Hudson v. McMillian,
503 U.S. 1 (1992), determined that the beating by prison guards of a handcuffed inmate vio-
lated the inmate’s Eighth Amendment rights.
123 307 F. App’x 537 (2d Cir. 2009).
124 Id. at 538 (citation omitted).
125 145 F. App’x 964 (5th Cir. 2005).
126 Id. at 965.
127 231 F. App’x 592 (9th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1189 (2008).
128 Id. at 594. The dissent there strongly disagreed: “The Supreme Court’s dispropor-
tionality cases, as well as our own jurisprudence interpreting the principle, clearly establish
that sentences that are excessive in light of the defendant’s diminished culpability violate the
Eighth Amendment. Accordingly, sentencing a schizophrenic man to an indeterminate life
sentence for stealing $62 of alcohol is unconstitutional.” Id. at 600 (Ferguson, J., dissenting).
129 237 F. App’x 550 (11th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1005 (2008).
130 Id. at 567.
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• Commonwealth v. Yasipour.131 Sentence of 20–40 years on a murder
charge allowed in spite of reliance on Atkins by defense counsel. “We
conclude [Atkins is] inapposite because [it concerns] the constitutional
limitations on the imposition of the death penalty . . . . Appellant, unlike
the defendant in Atkins, is not subject to a sentence of execution for his
crime. Thus, we fail to see how Atkins supports Appellant’s position.”132
• United States v. Moore.133 The defense counsel contended that a manda-
tory minimum penalty of 180 months for a convicted felon possessing
a firearm was, under Atkins, unconstitutional as applied to the defen-
dant, a mentally retarded individual.134 Quoting an earlier unpublished
opinion,135 the court reiterated that “‘[i]mposing a mandatory minimum
sentence on a defendant with limited mental capabilities does not violate
the Eighth Amendment ban against cruel and unusual punishment.’”136
The earlier decision made explicit how little Atkins would be involved
in a non-capital sentencing prosecution:
Imposing a mandatory minimum sentence on a defendant
with limited mental capabilities does not violate the Eighth
Amendment ban against cruel and unusual punishment. Tucker
relies on the Supreme Court decision in Atkins v. Virginia, argu-
ing that imposing a mandatory minimum sentence on a mentally
retarded individual is unconstitutional. This reliance is misplaced;
the holding in Atkins specifically addressed “whether the death
penalty should ever be imposed on a mentally retarded criminal.”
As such it does not address the present issue.137
131 957 A.2d 734 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2008).
132 Id. at 743–44.
133 643 F.3d 451 (6th Cir. 2011).
134 Id. at 453–54.
135 United States v. Tucker, 204 F. App’x 518 (6th Cir. 2006).
136 Moore, 643 F.3d at 454.
137 Tucker, 204 F. App’x at 521–22 (citations omitted). This proposition was attacked by
Cone:
The relevance of the mental retardation mitigator to the proportion-
ality of a non-capital case sentence cannot be ignored simply by labeling
the sentence as “mandatory.” Because the relevance of this mitigator
arises as a matter of constitutional law, a mandatory minimum statute
cannot make it any less relevant by cutting off its consideration. To the
contrary, under the rationale of Atkins, when a sentencing judge deter-
mines that, as applied to a mentally retarded offender, a statutory man-
datory minimum term . . . might be “grossly disproportionate,” that judge
has a constitutional duty to consider whether the sentence might violate
the Eighth Amendment.
Cone, supra note 100, at 43.
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This rather dismissive set of decisions appears to be the only sentencing decisions
to actually cite and rely upon Atkins, albeit to reject the defense argument. One trial
court did thoughtfully apply Atkins in favor of the defendant in a non-capital sentenc-
ing decision. The District Judge in United States v. Larson138 was persuaded by the
defense contention that imposing a mandatory minimum sentence on the defendant
who was mentally retarded violated the Eighth Amendment, relying almost entirely
on Atkins. The court’s language is instructive:
Looking to the general purposes Congress intends criminal
sentences to serve, and to the Atkins Court’s recognition that for
those purposes to be served, the severity of the punishment must
necessarily depend on the offender’s culpability . . . .
Measured against the Supreme Court’s recognition in Atkins
of the clinical definition of mental retardation, and of the rela-
tionship between mental retardation and personal culpability, the
description of Joshua that emerges from the trial testimony com-
pels the conclusion that Joshua’s deficiencies diminish his per-
sonal culpability . . . .
Here, sending Joshua to federal prison for five years would
not only violate the Eighth Amendment principle identified in
Atkins, but also would undermine the purposes of punishment
Congress has recognized for general intent crimes like those
Joshua is charged with violating . . . .
[T]he mandatory minimum, which as applied to Joshua[,]
violates the punitory principle that the severity of the punishment
must correspond to the personal culpability of the defendant.139
The court on appeal was not at all moved by the application of Atkins to the non-
capital setting and summarily vacated the District Judge’s ruling, with no substantive
explanation.140 In responding to a related equal protection argument, the appeals court
did note that there are “procedural and substantive considerations [which] the legal
system already offers developmentally-disabled individuals.”141 The judges did not
explain what those considerations are.142
138 558 F. Supp. 2d 1103 (D. Mont. 2008).
139 Id. at 1111–13.
140 United States v. Larson, 346 F. App’x 166, 169 (9th Cir. 2009).
141 Id.
142 See also Welch v. State, 335 S.W.3d 376 (Tex. App. 2011), where the court set out the
reasons why, in this context, the Supreme Court’s decision in Atkins—and related cases in
the death penalty setting—has indicated that:
[A] term of years is different in kind from the death penalty, [and] the
Supreme Court has largely deferred to the sentencing schemes devised
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The conclusion that Atkins seems to play no role in non-capital sentencing should
not, perhaps, be wholly surprising. It may be explained by the notion of incapacitation.
After all, a disabled defendant spared death under Atkins is still imprisoned, likely for
the rest of his life. Using the Atkins rationale in a non-capital sentencing situation may
result in a defendant being imprisoned for a significantly shorter period of time.143
True, but if one believes what the Court wrote in Atkins about mentally disabled defen-
dants being less culpable than others, such a result should be applauded, not avoided.
And, if we are to be serious about the application of Atkins, sentencing statutes and
guidelines ought to expressly take account of intellectual disabilities, and sentencing
judges should also be required to refer specifically to low intelligence of offenders
in passing sentences. Such changes would be a welcome recognition of the wisdom
of Atkins beyond the death penalty prosecution.
CONCLUSION
Without question Atkins has had a major impact in capital cases, though creating
a rather muddled view of who is to be viewed as intellectually disabled and which
procedures are appropriate under the Eighth Amendment. In non-capital cases, how-
ever, the picture is very different. Looking at three areas of major importance—
interrogation and confessions, assisting counsel, and sentencing—I reach the conclu-
sion that Atkins has had virtually no impact at all. In spite of tremendous scientific
support for the more careful treatment of offenders with low intelligence, and the
Supreme Court’s affirmation of that view, it seems as if Atkins simply is not considered
very much—if at all—in non-death penalty prosecutions.
by the nation’s legislatures . . . . Unlike challenges in the capital con-
text, the Eighth Amendment does not similarly require individualized
sentencing for a term of years. The Supreme Court has drawn the line at
death; for all other punishments—even life without parole—mandatory
sentencing schemes that preclude the presentation of mitigating evi-
dence are entirely permissible.
Id. at 380 (citations omitted).
143 With thanks to my colleague Jeff Bellin for his incisive thoughts here.
